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Late Antiquity and World History: Challenging Conventional Narratives and Analyses 
 
Mark Humphries 
 
Abstract 
The flourishing of late-antique studies in the last half-century has coincided with the rise of 
“world history” as an area of academic research. To an extent, some overlap has occurred, 
particularly with Sasanian Persia being considered alongside the late Roman Empire as 
constituting an essential component in what we think of in terms of the “shape” of late antiquity. 
Yet it is still the case that many approaches to late antiquity are bound up with conventional 
western narratives of historical progress, as defined in Jack Goody’s The Theft of History (2006). 
Indeed, the debate about whether late antiquity was an age of dynamic transformation (as argued 
by Peter Brown and his disciples) or one of catastrophic disruption (as asserted, most recently, 
by Bryan Ward-Perkins) can be regarded as representing two different faces of an essentially 
evolutionary interpretation of western historical development. This article argues, however, that 
we can challenge such conventional narrative frameworks by taking a world historical perspective 
on late antiquity. It will show, first, that our interpretation of late antiquity depends on sources 
that themselves are representative of myriad local perspectives. Secondly, it will argue that since 
Gibbon’s time these sources have been made to serve an essentially western construct of and 
debate about history. The final section will consider how taking a more global perspective allows 
us to challenge conventional approaches to and narratives of late antiquity. 
 
Introduction 
This article offers an unashamedly personal set of challenges to conventional approaches to the 
study of late antiquity. In particular, it recommends that some of the impasses that currently 
bedevil debates in the discipline might be overcome by adopting a more world-historical 
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approach to the subject. By that I mean not only seeing the history of late antiquity in a wider 
geographical perspective, but also a viewpoint that adopts an ethical stance that challenges the 
current paradigms within which late antiquity is debated: as will be argued below, conventional 
accounts of the period focus their narratives around the experiences of the Roman Empire and, 
therefore, articulate an essentially Western and Eurocentric interpretation of historical 
development. Of course, many specialists in the field are already making significant advances 
away from this western-dominated narrative; nevertheless, it strikes me as a worthwhile exercise 
to draw the strands of the debate together and to offer pointers to possible future directions. 
Given the scope of the undertaking implicit in this recommendation, the enquiry 
presented here can only offer a brief overview of the themes and issues I want to contest: the 
examples cited below could be multiplied exponentially,1 and I aim to investigate many of the 
issues in more detail in the future. In other words, what is presented here is only the beginning 
of a larger project. I should also clarify that the outcomes of what I suggest here might take 
many forms. I have written this article mainly with an eye to research agendas; but there is no 
reason why some of the perspectives recommended here could not also be imported into a 
classroom setting, where they would surely provoke interesting discussions. But to begin with, 
and in order to demonstrate how ingrained the conventional approaches I wish to challenge have 
become, I present a narrative that will seem, at first, wholly familiar. 
A victory had been won and the ruler wanted to celebrate it. The barbarians, true to 
form, had been duplicitous and had broken the treaty. Now a great hosting of them (Goths, 
Germans, and others) had invaded the empire, but they were no match for the empire’s forces 
and had been utterly defeated. Many of the enemy had been slain in bloody vengeance for their 
treacherous behaviour in starting the war. More importantly, many of their leading men had been 
captured; best of all, their king had been captured alive. He would make a fine ornament for the 
ruler’s victory celebrations at his capital, a living example of the ruler’s indomitable power, a 
figure to be humiliated and put on public display. Such a great victory also deserved a permanent 
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commemoration in text and image, so reliefs and inscriptions were set up showing the ruler in all 
his might lording it over his abject, cowering foe. 
 Such images are familiar to us from Roman imperial and late-antique monuments, like 
the reliefs from the now lost triumphal monument of Marcus Aurelius or from the extant arch of 
Septimius Severus in Rome, or those that decorate the obelisk base of Theodosius I in the 
hippodrome in Constantinople.2 But the set of victories and commemorations I have been 
describing so far do not come from that familiar context. Rather, the triumphant ruler was 
Shapur I, shahanshah of Sasanian Persia; the defeated barbarians were the Romans; and the 
captive king the Emperor Valerian in 260. For humiliating display, I have in mind the tradition 
that Shapur used Valerian as a stool when mounting his horse or getting into his carriage, and 
that later, when the emperor died, his corpse was flayed and his skin tanned to provide a more 
permanent trophy.3 As for the epigraphic and visual commemorations, I mean the so-called Res 
Gestae Divi Saporis, the great trilingual inscription recording Shapur’s victories, and the rock reliefs 
at Naqsh-i Rustam and Bishapur, showing his triumph over not only Valerian, but Gordian III 
and Philip the Arab too.4 If, however, anyone steeped in Roman imperial or late-antique history 
had assumed that my earlier description alluded to the victories of a Marcus, Severus, or 
Theodosius, their misapprehension would be wholly understandable, for they have been 
conditioned to think of a world centred on Rome, Constantinople, and the Mediterranean. 
That this should be the case attests to the profound influence on modern perceptions of 
a supposedly “normative” world view underwritten by traditional, classical geographical divisions 
of the world into a civilized centre and barbaric periphery.5 In this traditional schema, Persians, 
like other non-Romans, inhabit the margins of the map. Such a world-view underpins classical 
and classicising historiography, and can be found, for instance, in the fourth-century Latin 
historian Ammianus Marcellinus’ celebrated description of the Huns as being “abnormally 
savage” and living “beyond the Maeotic sea, near the frozen ocean”. He goes on to catalogue 
their lifestyle in a form that reads like a negative checklist of the accoutrements of civilization as 
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it was viewed by the Greeks and Romans: the Huns lack every marker of civilized life, from fire, 
to cities, to politics, and are only acknowledged begrudgingly as human. They are, therefore, 
doubly remote from civilization, in terms of both their geographical distance and their lack of 
cultural attainments.6 
But the achievements of Shapur I, and his epigraphic and monumental commemoration 
of them, remind us that other perspectives, not centred on the classical Mediterranean, are 
possible – and it is these perspectives that I want to explore here. I will organise my reflections 
as follows. First I will offer a survey of late-antique perspectives on the world, showing their 
variety and complexity, and how they demonstrate that the Mediterranean-centred perspective of 
classical and classicising historiography is not the only view possible. Next, I will discuss how the 
traditional shape of late antiquity has been made to fit into a customary western, and essentially 
Eurocentric, view of history – and how this might be regarded as deeply problematic. The final 
part of the paper will consider how that traditional view might be challenged by adopting an 
approach that is more sensitive both to the multiple local perspectives outlined in the first part of 
the discussion and to global contexts; this in turn will show how, by advocating a more world-
historical perspective on events, we can challenge traditional narratives of the period, and see 
events in a new light.7 
 
A variety of perspectives 
The ancients knew, of course, that there was a wider word beyond that in which they lived, and, 
moreover, that events in remote places could have profound implications for them, For example, 
in 357, negotiations took place on the frontier in Mesopotamia, between Strategius Musonianus, 
the praetorian prefect of Oriens speaking for the Roman Emperor Constantius II, and 
Tamsapor, representative of the Sasanian shah, Shapur II. Our source, Ammianus, reports that 
intelligence had reached Musonianus that Shapur was distracted by troubles “on the remotest 
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frontiers of his realm, [and] was with difficulty and with great bloodshed of his troops driving 
back hostile tribesmen.” The prefect therefore instructed Tamsapor that 
he should by letter advise the king finally to make peace with the Roman emperor, in 
order that by so doing he might be secure on his whole western frontier and could rush 
upon his persistent enemies [i.e. in central Asia]. Tamsapor consented and relying on this 
information, reported to the king that Constantius, being involved in very serious wars, 
entreated and begged for peace. But while these communications were being sent to the 
Chionitae and Euseni, in whose territories Sapor [Shapur] was passing the winter, a long 
time elapsed.8 
 A similar story, told this time from a Persian perspective, albeit preserved in the narrative 
of the Greek historian Menander Protector, recounts a speech delivered by the Persian envoy 
Andigan to the representatives of the emperor Tiberius II (578-82). On this occasion, the 
Persians enjoyed the strategic advantage, since Tiberius’ armies were fighting on several frontiers 
at once, but the Persians were at war only with Rome. In Andigan’s view, this made the 
negotiation of peace a desirable outcome for the Romans; the alternative offered a grim 
prospect: 
You are at war with many peoples, we with you alone: thus the necessity of the treaty. 
Just as the Romans would be certain to prevail if they were fighting either a number of 
tribes or the Persian kingdom alone, so we shall certainly conquer since we have a 
dispute with no one but the Romans and since we are committed to only one war.9 
These two accounts, from two centuries apart, essentially tell the same story: the rivalry between 
Rome and Persia in the Middle East was determined not solely by events along the specific 
frontier that separated them, but by events across a wider geographical arena: distractions of the 
Persians deep in central Asia, or of the Romans in Europe, could seriously compromise the 
ability of either power to wage war on the other. 
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 It is clear, moreover, that this level of mutual understanding led Rome and Persia to 
develop some sort of begrudging respect for each other in late antiquity. One manifestation of 
this is a tantalising story related by Procopius and Agathias that when the Emperor Arcadius died 
in 408, he entrusted his baby son Theodosius II to the protection of the Persian king Yazdegerd 
I.10 But the relationship reached its apogee in the later sixth century, when it is summarised in the 
words that Theophylact Simocatta places in the mouth of the shah Khusro II (590-628) in a 
letter to the Roman emperor Maurice (582-602): 
God effected that the whole world should be illuminated from the very beginning by two 
eyes, namely by the most powerful kingdom of the Romans and by the most prudent 
sceptre of the Persian state. For by these greatest powers, the disobedient and bellicose 
tribes are winnowed and man’s course is continually regulated and guided.11 
This was not mere rhetoric: on occasion we can witness the Roman and Persian empires 
cooperating, such as in Maurice’s efforts to establish Khusro II on his throne, or in collaborative 
Romano-Persian efforts to defend the Caucasus from raids mounded by central Asian nomads.12 
 While consideration of Romano-Persian interaction certainly extends our vision beyond a 
Mediterranean world centred on Rome and Constantinople, it risks simply replacing one vision 
of the world with another which this time has two centres – the two eyes spoken of by 
Theophylact. What we need to bear in mind is that beyond this simple bi-polar vision there is 
any number of multiple perspectives. For the world between Rome and Persia, we are singularly 
fortunate in having a wide range of contemporary accounts, composed in languages such as 
Armenian and Syriac, as well as later Arabic histories which  incorporate earlier sources 
(including Persian ones),13 that enable us to access the experiences of peoples living between the 
empires. Such sources demonstrate that when Rome and Persia came to war, their conflicts 
could provide opportunities that communities living along the frontier could exploit to their own 
benefit. An episode narrated in the Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite shows how, during the 
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Anastasian War of 502-506, the distraction of a major interregional conflict could open up 
opportunities for local Arab populations: 
The Roman Tayyaye [Arabs] also crossed the Tigris in front of them, plundering 
capturing, and destroying all they could find in Persian territory. Since I know that you 
carefully examine everything, your holiness will well understand that this war was the 
cause of much enrichment for the Tayyaye [Arabs] on both sides, and that they did as 
they pleased in both empires.14 
Such local perspectives are not limited to the frontier in the Middle East, but can be 
replicated also in the West. A striking example is offered in the account offered by the Spanish 
chronicler Hydatius of Lemica of events in the year 410. Now 410 is a significant watershed year 
in traditional narratives of the fall of Roman power in the West, since it saw the sack of Rome by 
Alaric’s Goths. That is not an event that Hydatius omits, but what is remarkable is that in his 
narrative it is overshadowed by events in Hydatius’ Spanish homeland. The sack of Rome is 
dispensed with in a few short sentences that mention the event itself and the capture of the 
imperial princess Galla Placidia. By contrast, affairs in Spain receive more fulsome treatment: 
there are notices of barbarians invading the Iberian peninsula, of the disease that followed in the 
wake of these of upheavals, and then a long discursive passage that analyses those events in 
apocalyptic terms: all told, the Spanish passage is almost three times as long as the entry on 
Alaric at Rome.15 It is important to bear in mind, of course, that Hydatius’s narrative is coloured 
by his own particular perspective on events, in particular his apocalyptic outlook and sense that 
he was, in some way, writing a history of the end of the world.16 
The narrative of Hydatius – by highlighting events in Spain over those at Rome – 
presents an unfamiliar perspective, in which events like the sack of Rome that are central to 
conventional grand narratives of late antiquity are passed over relatively quickly in favour of 
detailed accounts of more local history. If, from a viewpoint centred on the Mediterranean, Spain 
might seem marginal, the effect of using a non-metropolitan source like Hydatius is to offer a 
 8 
 
different perspective opposed to that master narrative. The perspective offered by Pseudo-
Joshua similarly presents a view from the periphery, but considered alongside a rich tradition of 
Syriac literature, makes even more emphatic than Hydatius the point that such “peripheries” can 
be considered as “centers” in their own right: it is possible to write a history of the frontier in 
Syria that sees it as central, and the Roman and Persian empires as marginal; a broadly similar 
case can be adumbrated for Armenia.17 These myriad local perspectives therefore present an 
opportunity to challenge the traditional account of late antiquity with its Mediterranean-focussed 
overarching grand narrative. It is to this theme that I now turn. 
 
Grand narratives 
(i) The End of the World: Sources and Narrative Choices 
Why have events at Rome in 410 traditionally commanded our attention more than those in 
Spain? In part, it reflects the perspectives of some contemporaries, who saw the Gothic sack in 
particularly portentous terms. A vivid account offered by Jerome recounts his emotional turmoil 
when he received news that “the city that had taken the whole world was itself taken.”18 For 
contemporaries, in the Latin West at any rate,19 such events seemed to signal a sense in which an 
established order was coming to an end. Another contemporary, the chronicler Prosper of 
Aquitaine, vividly attests to this view in his account of the capture of Carthage by the Vandals in 
439. Having described the violence of the Vandals towards both Africa’s citizens and its 
churches, Prosper commented: “Carthage suffered this captivity in the 585th year after it had 
become Roman.”20 In the Eastern Empire, where notions that Roman rule had been ordained by 
God (an idea first formulated in the early fourth century by Eusebius of Caesarea in the heady 
atmosphere of the Christian Emperor Constantine’s reign) persisted, this conception of imperial 
endings took a little longer to become established.21 Moreover, when it came to be expressed, by 
the chronicler Marcellinus Comes in the sixth century, it was motivated by different concerns 
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from those that had motivated Jerome and Prosper. For Marcellinus, the deposition of the “last” 
western emperor Romulus Augustulus in 476 could be presented in symbolic terms: 
With this Augustulus perished the Western empire of the Roman people, which the first 
Augustus, Octavian, began to rule in the seven hundred and ninth year from the 
foundation of the city. This occurred in the five hundred and twenty-second year of the 
kingdom of the departed emperors, with Gothic kings thereafter holding Rome.22 
As Brian Croke has shown, this presentation was calibrated to the concerns of an eastern 
establishment contemplating reconquest of the lost western provinces, and for whom it made 
sense to manufacture 476 as a turning point and to rewrite half-a-century’s worth of diplomatic 
relations between Constantinople and Italy in order to provide a pretext for Justinian’s western 
wars.23 By contrast, contemporary responses in 476 to the deposition of Romulus had been more 
sanguine, even at Constantinople. A fragment of Malchus of Philadelpia’s history reports that 
when a delegation from the senate of Rome came to the eastern emperor Zeno to report the 
deposition of Romulus and claim that one emperor would be enough for them, Zeno dismissed 
them with the response that they still had an emperor: Julius Nepos, who had been sent to Italy 
in 473, deposed a year later, but was still claiming to rule “the West” from Dalmatia.24 So far as 
Zeno was concerned, the western empire was not dead yet. 
 I have spent some time rehearsing these familiar details because they have exercised a 
defining influence on modern perceptions of the grand narrative of late antiquity. Dates such as 
410, 439, and 476 – along with others, such as the Gothic immigration in 376 or the battle of 
Hadrianople in 378 – have dominated our construction of the age. A restatement offered by 
Peter Heather makes clear not only what he sees as historically plausible, but also implies what 
he finds rhetorically pleasing: 
[T]here is no serious historian who thinks that the western Empire fell entirely because 
of internal problems, or entirely because of exogenous shock. The emphasis of this book 
has been primarily on the latter, because in my view the growth of Hunnic power in 
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Europe has been misunderstood and, with it, the intimate link between the arrival of the 
Huns [in c. 376] and the deposition of Romulus Augustulus [the last western emperor, in 
476].25 
Not everyone has agreed: in a pungent rejoinder, Michael Kulikowski has asserted that 
“Heather’s idée fixe — that the Huns were responsible for the fall of the Roman empire and the 
end of the ancient world — is simple, elegant, and wrong.”26  
The very debate about the significance of events such as those in 376, 378, 410, 476 and 
numerous others is instructive. In one sense it is depressingly so, in that it suggests that the 
major chronological nodes of the debate have moved on little since Edward Gibbon penned his 
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire more than two hundred years ago. I will return to 
Gibbon presently, but for the moment let me also suggest that it is instructive of the point I 
made earlier in connection with my slightly devious presentation of the victories of Shapur I – 
namely, that such views reflect the dominance of a select number of sources, whose perspectives 
reflect what are regarded as ‘normative’, metropolitan views on our conception of the grand 
narrative of the period: Jerome, lamenting the capture of the city that had captured the world, 
was, memorably, more Ciceronian than Christian;27 Prosper, who passed judgement of the end of 
Roman Carthage, may have been from Aquitaine, but was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Roman papacy and its claims to primacy;28 and Marcellinus, as we saw, is representative of 
coalescing opinion at sixth-century Constantinople. In other words, by prioritising their 
perspectives, and the sort of narrative they imply, we are relegating to the margins the sort of 
view on events presented by authors like Hydatius and Pseudo-Joshua. But is such 
marginalisation acceptable? I would contend that it is deeply problematic, since it implies 
complicity in a particular view of history.29 Let me return now to Gibbon. 
 
(ii) Decline, Fall, and Transformation 
 11 
 
The importance of the narrative constructed by Gibbon in his Decline and Fall and the reactions 
against it in, especially, the last half-century, are so well known as to be dispensed with relatively 
quickly. In his significant recharacterisation of the age, The World of Late Antiquity (1971), Peter 
Brown remarked: “It is only too easy to write about the Late Antique world as if it were merely a 
melancholy tale of ‘Decline and Fall’.” Such a picture, he argued, could not account for the 
largely positive developments of the era: “why Europe became Christian and why the Near East 
became Muslim,” for example. In his view: “Looking at the Late Antique world, we are caught 
between the regretful contemplation of ancient ruins and the excited acclamation of new 
growth.”30 Under Brown’s influence, the balance now shifted towards a consideration of cultural 
transformation and an emphasis on continuities over disruption;31 moreover, the geographical 
horizons were now extended to encompass the Near East and Islam as well as Europe and 
Christendom. 
In the decades that followed, it is clear that excited acclamation overtook regretful 
contemplation. In 1996, for example, Glen Bowersock remarked that “it is probably fair to say 
that no responsible historian of the ancient or medieval world would want to address or 
acknowledge the fall of Rome as either fact or paradigm”; and that “[t]he fall of Rome is no 
longer needed, and like the writing on a faded papyrus, it no longer speaks to us.”32 More 
recently, Edward James remarked with trenchant optimism that “‘Decline’ has been banned 
from the … vocabulary” of scholars working in the field.33 Such assertions might be taken as 
indicating that Gibbon’s views had been consigned to the historiographical scrap heap, and that 
any restatement of them is at best old-fashioned (perhaps even irresponsible). But there are good 
reasons for regarding that optimism as having been misplaced. For in fact, the last fifteen years 
have seen renewed interest in decline and fall as hermeneutical tools with which to interpret late 
antiquity. 
 Particular expressions of disquiet began to be expressed by scholars working on late-
antique urbanism. Thus in 2001, the spirit of Gibbon was unmistakably present in the title of 
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Wolf Liebeschuetz’s Decline and Fall of the Roman City.34 A more forceful statement of misgivings 
about the whole post-Brown late antiquity project was to be found in the editors’ prefatory 
remarks to one of the volumes dealing with cities that emerged from the European Science 
Foundation’s Transformation of the Roman World project. What is also striking is that their 
conclusion is clearly influenced by particular geographical and chronological preconceptions: 
From the perspective of any research into urbanism that starts with the Roman period, it is 
very difficult to view developments in the sixth and seventh centuries, except for the late 
antique christianization of the city, as part of some neutral (or even positive) 
“transformation”. The changes that occurred in urban life generally look more like the 
dissolution of a sophisticated and impressive experiment in how to order society – an 
experiment developed by the Greeks and Romans and centred on the Mediterranean.35 
Indeed, it is one of the authors of this observation, Bryan Ward-Perkins, who has contributed 
the most sustained critique of the post-Brownian vision of late antiquity as an age of neutral or 
positive transformation. In his 2005 study, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization, he asserts 
that late antiquity needs to be considered anew as a period of disruption and collapse.36 
Works like that by Ward-Perkins, and that of Peter Heather mentioned earlier, seem to 
suggest a resurgence of an essentially Gibbonian view of history, and indeed have been 
characterised as regressive.37 At one level, this might mean little more than that the pendulum of 
historical opinion is swinging back against Brown and his disciples.38 But I think there is 
something rather more than that at stake. In short, it seems to me insistence on decline and fall 
reflects a particularly prejudiced perspective on the end of the ancient world and emergence of 
the middle ages.39 We need to return to Gibbon to see what I mean. 
To Gibbon, and for all his efforts to encompass Byzantium and Islam in his narrative,40 
the demise of the Roman empire was first and foremost an event significant in western 
European history. That significance is implicit throughout much of his narrative, but in his 
“General considerations on the decline of the empire in the west” that concluded volume 3 of 
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his history, Gibbon made this European dimension explicit by considering how a similar chain 
of events might impact on the Europe of his own day.41 When the final volume of Decline and 
Fall was published in 1788, Gibbon was probably content that his image of a civilization brought 
low by the irruption of external factors – alien peoples, the barbarians, and an alien creed, 
Christianity – was a reasoned one. But almost immediately there were to unfold events that were 
to cause Gibbon to think of other factors that he had omitted from consideration. As France 
was thrown into the convulsive horrors of revolution, Gibbon was forced to the realisation that 
some central tenets of his History were seriously mistaken. In particular, the events in France 
made him wonder if he had seriously underestimated the significance of internal revolts and civil 
wars in the undermining of the empire. In papers prepared for an unrealised seventh volume of 
Decline and Fall he noted: “Should I not have deduced the decline of the Empire from the Civil 
Wars, that ensued after the fall of Nero or even from the tyranny which succeeded the reign of 
Augustus? Alas! I should: but of what avail is this tardy knowledge? Where error is irretrievable, 
repentance is useless.”42 
 
(iii) Geographies, Eurocentricism, and the Theft of History 
Gibbon’s misgivings, it seems to me, have been too little appreciated in recent years. Moreover, 
the geographical focus on the Mediterranean and Europe that dominates much work (but not all: 
see below) on late antiquity and the early middle ages, and which has had an enduring impact on 
the very structures we impose on the past (for example, through periodization, in which “the fall 
of Rome” is a hinge moment), is deeply problematic. It belongs to a style of analysing the past 
that has been characterised by the anthropologist Jack Goody as amounting to a European theft 
of history, where the experiences of Europe provide the central framework within which the 
totality of history is interpreted, and where the central concern of historians is largely focussed 
on Europe (particularly north-western Europe).43 Goody’s characterisation of how western 
 14 
 
history “works” can be traced in various ways in modern histories of the late and post-Roman 
world, and have, I think, been signally important in the recent enthusiasm for decline and fall. 
Consider, by way of example, two standard overviews of the late-antique/early medieval 
period published in related, if distinct, series: volume 14 of the second edition of the Cambridge 
Ancient History (CAH 14), covering 425-600, and the first volume New Cambridge Medieval History 
(NCMH 1) covering circa 500 to circa 700.44 Their chronological overlap is not matched, however, 
by precise geographical concurrence. CAH 14 is altogether more concerned with the world of 
the eastern Mediterranean and territories such as Armenia and Persia; NCMH 1 does not neglect 
these (early Byzantium and Islam receive detailed treatment), but even so the geographical focus 
has unmistakably moved west and north to be centred on Europe, and includes territories like 
Ireland that lay outside the purview of CAH 14. In both cases, the geographical focus of these 
compendia is shaped by their narrative concerns: the CAH is clearly shaped by the world that 
has gone before, and reflects a world view that encompasses, and saw as central, the Near East 
and the southern shores of the Mediterranean; the NCMH, by contrast, is clearly shaped by the 
world that is to come: a world focused on the medieval civilization of, above all, Europe.45 The 
medieval histories of Near Eastern territories and North Africa belong elsewhere.46 
In this respect, we can see one influence of Goody’s Western theft of history, in that as 
we move from antiquity to the middle ages we also move inexorably westwards (and northwards) 
to an emphatically European history. That is not to say that such a vision has not been 
challenged. Peter Sarris’ recent overview of the period 500-700, published somewhat 
incongruously in the “Oxford History of Medieval Europe”, is altogether more wide-ranging in 
its geographical vision than many comparable histories (including NCMH 1).47 As Christopher 
Kelly pointed out in his review of Sarris, “It is easy for forget that this is hard-fought territory, 
disputed by fractious experts and partitioned between different university departments.”48 Here 
we gain a glimpse of how fraught a task is any effort to challenge, for late antiquity, the Western 
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theft of history identified by Goody: anyone seeking to issue such a challenge would need to 
overcome deep-rooted academic and institutional divisions. 
 
(iv) Narratives, Progress, and Analogy 
Another feature of this western construct of history noted by Goody is its insistence on progress 
as an essentially upward curve from “the dawn of civilization” through to modern industrial 
capitalism. In any such narrative, the end of the ancient world seems to represent a disruption of 
that upward curve, and the recent restatements of decline and fall have noted this. For instance, 
in 1996, the Italian scholar Aldo Schiavone, in an account of the lack of a seamless progression 
from the ancient to modern world, noted that the study of late antiquity (particular the 
Brownian late antiquity with its emphasis on transformation) was a valuable enterprise: i t 
presented the historian with “an entirely new universe … in which simplistic and teleological 
explanations have no part”. At the same time, however, he suggested that it “tends to 
overshadow an essential point”, by “downplaying the disruptive and catastrophic aspects of 
the changeover” between antiquity and the Middle Ages, a process that he described in a 
memorable phrase as a “historical thrombosis”.49 In Schiavone’s view, the roots of Rome’s 
fall were to be sought in the structure of its economy, in particular the reliance on slave 
labour for productivity. Such an economy, he argued, had no inherent growth mechanism; as 
a result, it could only expand so far and no further, and its ultimate collapse was in many 
respects inevitable.50 
Ward-Perkins’ The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization is, I think, even more 
embroiled in this western narrative of progress and its disruption – and it is precisely this 
disruption to progress that allows him to present the late-antique/early-medieval transition 
in such bleak terms. He makes frequent use of analogy to draw attention to the complexity of 
the Roman system in the period before the “Germanic invasions.” Such analogies contribute to a 
picture of Roman imperial civilization that risks distorting by stressing its inherent modernity. 
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We are repeatedly told that the use of some commodity — such as metals, roof tiles, pottery, 
bricks, and even literacy — was not to be paralleled in Europe until the late-medieval or modern 
period.51 In other words, the fall of Rome is presented as a disruption of that essentially 
progressive model of western history.52 
 
(v) The barbarians and the wider world 
In addition to presenting the fall of Rome as a disruption of progress, this decline and fall model 
subscribes to the western theft of history in a third way, in how it presents the barbarian peoples 
who transformed the political landscape of the Roman world by relegating them to the position 
of outsiders who crashed in towards the centre, wreaking destruction in their wake. This neatly 
reflects the perspective of the late antique Greek and Latin literary sources upon which historians 
customarily rely. For them, the world beyond the empire’s frontiers was little known and barely 
understood beyond standard geographical and enthnographic topoi: when Ammianus mentioned 
the Chionitae and Euseni in the context of Musonianus’ negotiations with Tamsapor in 357, he 
gives little indication of their precise geographical location, apart from their remoteness (see 
above pp. 000-000). Occasional glimpses of distant lands and peoples can be had, for example, 
from Priscus of Panium’s account of his visit to court of Attila in central Europe in the fifth 
century, or Menander Protector’s references to east Roman contacts with the Turkish tribes 
around the Caspian Sea in the sixth century.53 In spite of this, the essential picture presented by 
the sources is one that, as anthropologist Thomas J. Barfield has remarked of the relationship 
between China and the nomads of the central Asian steppe, consists “of seemingly random 
events presented chronologically, with one obscure tribe following another.”54 Yet, to 
comprehend the events of late antiquity, it is necessary to take a wider view. After all, the 
barbarian invasions represent (depending on one’s viewpoint) an overlapping or collision of the 
histories of the Mediterranean region and the wider world, and I do not think it is possible to 
comprehend one without consideration of the other.55 In other words, the traditional narrative 
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plot of barbarian invasions and the late-antique transition demands consideration of that wider 
world. In much of what follows, I will use “Eurasia” as a shorthand for that broader perspective, 
but it should be borne in mind constantly that the geographical horizons went further still: for 
instance, interactions between Rome and Persia also encompassed parts of Africa (Axum in 
Ethiopia) and Arabia (Himyar in Yemen) to the south, as well as Armenia and the Caucasus to 
the north. 
 
Late Antiquity and World History 
In the last section of this article, I want to examine the potential of considering late antiquity 
against such a wider world-historical background. To begin with, I need to revisit the question of 
what we mean by the term “late antiquity”, show how subjective it is, and demonstrate how it 
has often excluded a world-historical perspective. Only then can we posit a wider, global 
perspective and explore the avenues for enquiry that it might open up. 
 
(i) What (When, and Where) is Late Antiquity? 
Although the current debate on late antiquity takes its impetus from, above all, the publications 
of Peter Brown and his disciples (and detractors), the origins of the concept go back further, 
particularly to a cluster of art historians, notably Alois Riegl and Josef Strzygowski, working in 
the years around 1900.56 It was Riegl who first deployed Spätantike in his Spätrömische Kunstindustie 
(Vienna, 1901) to describe the arts and crafts of the transitional period between antiquity and the 
middle ages, and to see a metamorphosis of classical forms occurring at this point. As for 
Strzygowski, his Orient oder Rom (Leipzig, 1901), by looking to Iran as a source of artistic 
inspiration for new forms, perhaps hinted at an early attempt to understand this transitional 
period in world-historical terms; sadly, his venture was compromised by his adherence to notions 
of Aryan and Nordic supremacy that mirrored his political allegiances.57 
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 Subsequent developments in the study of late antiquity have largely been concerned with 
an overarching western narrative, squarely focussed on a story that has Mediterranean origins 
and a largely European outcome. Thus the term antiquité tardive came into vogue with French 
scholars interested in the development of the Roman Catholic tradition.58 In Anglophone 
scholarship, the Eurocentric tendency can be seen among both those scholars who approach late 
antiquity by moving forward from classical, Graeco-Roman antiquity into the fourth century and 
beyond;59 and those who take their starting point with the developed institutions of medieval 
Christendom and then move backwards in search of their origins.60 
In both of these cases, late antiquity is defined in relation to other periods as part of a 
particular narrative plot – as either a sequel during which the heritage of classical antiquity was 
transformed into something else (mainly conceived of in terms of western culture); or as a prequel 
during which the forms of medieval culture coalesced from the raw materials of an earlier age. 
Consequently it is unsurprising that there has been some difficulty in arriving at an agreed 
definition of the chronological parameters of late antiquity, beyond a vague consensus that it falls 
somewhere in the middle of the first millennium: even Brown’s programmatic World of Late 
Antiquity is vague on this, in spite of his advertised limits of Marcus Aurelius and Muhammad.61 
One result of this has been a resistance to what Andrea Giardina has diagnosed as an 
‘elephantiasis’ of late antiquity, in which the label is applied to a period that stretches ever further 
backwards into the Roman imperial period and forwards into the middle ages.62 Objections to 
this “long” late antiquity include those who are interested in different narrative plots, and who 
feel that these are obscured by the focus on the late antique: Averil Cameron has recently raised 
precisely this sort of concern from the perspective of Byzantinists.63 But this highlights an 
important issue: in large measure, chronological definitions (which traditionally have derived 
from political history, and so are difficult to delineate precisely for processes of cultural change) 
will always involve an element of subjectivity, depending on the narrative being constructed and 
the actors involved.64 
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Related to this is another point, and that relates not to when late antiquity was, but where it 
was. Geographical considerations will often depend on the particular emphases of a narrative. 
For instance, Garth Fowden proposed over twenty years ago that the stage for Romano-Persian 
conflicts in late antiquity, and their ideological (particularly religious) consequences, 
encompassed a vast “mountain arena”, stretching from Axum in Ethiopia to the mountain 
ranges of Afghanistan, from Yemen and Arabia to the Caucasus and the Caspian; his recent 
argument in favour of considering the first millennium as a chronological unit has restated, 
refined, and elaborated this geographical context, now cast as the “Eurasian hinge”.65 But this 
geographical focus depends on the story he wishes to tell, which in his recent restatement 
clusters around the development and maturation of monotheistic religious traditions in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam; and it has its costs, as can be seen in his characterisation of Latin 
Christendom in Western Europe as backward and underdeveloped.66 This means that cultural 
definitions of particular late-antique narratives can result in the exclusion from them of particular 
regions. At one level, this is understandable, since a particular argument requires a particular 
focus. But it results in a situation pithily described by Guy Halsall as one in which “Late 
Antiquity was just something that happened to other people”, for example by excluding from the 
narrative the inhabitants of Ireland or barbarian Europe.67 Just as much as periodization and 
narrative plots, the definitions of “central” regions (be they Brogiolo and Ward-Perkins’ 
“Graeco-Roman Mediterranean” or Fowden’s “Eurasian hinge”) involve a series of subjective 
choices. 
So how can other regions be integrated into a wider world history of late antiquity? One is to 
acknowledge interconnections between the various parts of the world in the late antique period 
(however we define it). By this I mean more than just traceable connections (to which I will 
return below), but also ones that determined the development of cultures and societies. In the 
essay by Halsall alluded to a moment ago, he argues that the development of societies abutting 
Rome’s European frontiers is such that one might argue that “Germanic-speaking barbaricum 
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was, perhaps paradoxically, more integrally a part of the Roman Empire than many of the 
imperial provinces.”68 But examining states bordering on the Empire through a Roman lens can 
bring its own risks, for example by highlighting features of non-Roman societies that resemble 
those found within the Empire to the exclusion of others. An important paper by Michael 
Morony on Sasanian Iran might seem to have done precisely that, by considering the extent to 
which the Persian empire resembled the Roman across a range of categories, such as political 
structure, religious profile, and military factors. But his intent was vigorous advocacy of the 
inclusion of the Sasanian polity as an integral part of the late antique world, and was conceived 
of in response to overly Romanocentric notions of what constitutes late antiquity.69 While this 
might seem to subsume the Sasanians into an explicitly western view of history, it has its uses 
beyond advocacy, since highlighting similarities between cultures and societies can allow for 
meaningful comparisons to be made.70 But as I hope to show now, we can go rather further than 
that.  
 
(ii) Global Perspectives on Late Antiquity 
I want to bring this article to a close by suggesting that a broader, global vista might allow us to 
put the late-antique experience of the Roman world in a more meaningful perspective than the 
traditional Mediterranean focus allows; and that such a perspective might allow us to ask useful 
questions about what we do when we study late antiquity. I should state very clearly that I am 
not pretending that no-one has attempted such an approach. An instructive example is provided 
by Giusto Traina’s study of the year 428, which takes its reader on a grand tour of the world, 
from Persia around the provinces of the Roman world (and, in some cases, the territories of a 
post-imperial west) and back again.71 The approach adopted in Traina’s book bears comparison 
with John Wills’ study of the year 1688, traditionally associated in Anglocentric historiography 
with the “Glorious Revolution”. By expanding his horizons, Wills was able to encompass other, 
less familiar narratives, presenting familiar events (at least to European historians) in the light of 
 21 
 
unfamiliar juxtapositions.72 Such a comparison, however, also highlights the very different 
resources upon which scholars of late antiquity and early modern history depend. While Wills’ 
account is truly global and encompasses regions such as the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa, 
Traina’s is still very much the world of Khusro II’s “two eyes of the world”, fixed on the Roman 
and Sasanian empires and adjacent territories.73 
 We might extend our geographical horizons much further than this. That connections 
existed across a wide sweep of Eurasia, from the Atlantic in the West to the Pacific in the East 
(and north to central Europe and the Baltic, or south into Africa), is hardly in doubt.74 A few 
examples will need to stand here for a much wider body of work. Touraj Daryaee has shown that 
the tentacles of Persian influence, as witnessed by evidence for trade, extended not only West 
towards the Roman empire and south to Arabia, Yemen, and Ethiopia, but also East to the 
Indian Ocean and the archipelagos of south-east Asia.75 Christopher Beckwith has meticulously 
traced the reach and dynamics of trade and other interactions across central Asia between 
Europe and T’ang China in the early middle ages.76 Meanwhile the work of the “Late Iron Age 
and ‘Roman’ Ireland” project has revealed the vigour of Irish contacts with Roman Britain that 
goes beyond trade to encompass conflict and cultural change.77 
If such connections are traceable, what are we to do with them? It should be stated 
immediately that we should not exaggerate them and make them into a totalising discourse that 
obscures the nuances of local diversity.78 Nor should we forget that many such contacts were 
often indirect and involved several stages of interaction between intermediary groups.79 On the 
whole, we are presented with a series of overlapping and intersecting zones of interactions and 
perceptions. This could happen even across comparatively small distances. A neat example 
emerges from Priscus of Panium’s account of his embassy to the court of Attila on behalf of the 
eastern emperor Theodosius II in 449: Priscus mentions the presence at the Hunnic court also of 
plenipotentiaries sent from the western emperor independently of the diplomatic initiatives 
emanating from Constantinople.80 On a much larger scale, we have seen that Persians clearly had 
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some view of the western reaches of the Roman Empire, just as Romans had some inkling of the 
Central Asian territories ruled by Persia (see above pp. 000-000). But both Persians and Romans 
had areas of interaction in other directions too, and for reasons unrelated to the ebb and flow of 
war and peace between them. In the case of the Persians, we can see that their interactions could 
reach as far east as China: the early historian of Islam, al-Tabari relates in his History of Kings and 
Prophets that as Sasanian Iran was being overrun by the Muslim Arabs, its last shah, Yazdegerd 
III, appealed to the emperor of China for help.81 The world was certainly interconnected – but 
those interconnections could be haphazard and piecemeal. 
We need, moreover, to allow that individual interactions, while they might be linked to 
wider geopolitical contacts between polities, often had a logic of their own. Consider, for 
instance, Sasanian contacts with Arabia: most often, these have been interpreted in a narrative of 
Romano-Persian rivalry that sees Roman and Persian influences in a string of territories from the 
Caucasus to Himyar in Yemen and Axum in Ethiopia as part of a grand strategy of imperial 
rivalry. In an earlier part of his History, al-Tabari recounts how when Shapur II (one of Rome’s 
most redoubtable enemies in the fourth century) came to the throne as a child in 309, his 
minority placed the Persian realm in a condition of weakness that was exploited by its 
neighbours. Arabs crossed the Persian Gulf and commandeered lands in southern Iran, and it 
was only when Shapur reached his majority that Persian power reasserted itself. This involved 
not only driving the Arabs back across the Gulf, but also a punitive military expedition deep into 
the Arabian peninsula that was, at least as al-Tabari describes it, violent, bloody, and disruptive.82 
Individual details of al-Tabari’s account might be questioned – but there is enough 
archaeological evidence to suggest that Sasanian influence on Arabia, particularly in the East and 
South, was indeed profound.83 More importantly for my purposes here, this is a campaign that 
leaves no trace whatsoever in the Greek and Latin sources of the period, and as such opens our 
eyes to a history in which Rome plays no part.84  
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What utility does this have for the historian of late antiquity? Above all, we should see it 
as offering opportunities to interrogate our conventional accounts of the late-antique and early 
medieval centuries. In her preface to the English translation of Traina’s 428 AD, Averil Cameron 
has drawn attention to “the unexpected juxtapositions of history” and to extraordinary instances 
of “simultaneity”.85 A similar point was made by Lester K. Little in his presidential address to the 
Medieval Academy of America in 2004: he noted that significant comparanda and juxtapositions 
can prompt us to ask questions that might never have occurred to us before, and that a global, 
comparative account of history might enable us to get away from what he identified as an 
essentially teleological and western-dominated narrative of history.86 Above all, while individual 
political histories might be traced across significant geographical distances, perhaps the greatest 
utility of adapting a world/global perspective on late antiquity would be in terms of thematic 
comparisons. 
Such comparanda and juxtapositions are not hard to find in late antiquity. Consider for 
example the activities of Christians like Patrick in Ireland, Ulfilas in Gothia, or Nestorian 
missionaries (not to mention Manichaean ones) travelling through the Near East to Central Asia 
and China. Each of them was involved in various ways with religious institutions within the 
Roman oikoumene; but they also extended their faiths outwards in various ways, and with far 
reaching consequences. Moreover, the last mentioned groups, Nestorians and Manichaeans, 
intersected with a world rich with other religious traditions, such as Buddhism.87 Comparing their 
various stories might highlight telling parallels, but equally, and just as importantly, it might pull 
into focus distinctive features of each narrative. To religious comparanda we might add other 
developments such as contemporaneous (both with each other, and with the religious histories 
outlined above) linguistic evolutions: the development of ogham script in Ireland depended on 
the influence of Latin;88 among the Goths in the Danubian territories, the missionary Ulfilas 
developed a Gothic alphabet, based on Greek, so that he could write down Christian scripture in 
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their language;89 and in Bactria in central Asia, Greek letters also formed the basis for a written 
form of a local language used between the fourth and eighth centuries.90 
Moreover, comparisons of political history across a broader geographical sweep allows us 
to see the experiences of the late Roman empire as less unique than the Eurocentric insistence of 
the “fall of Rome” paradigm might suggest. Barbarian invasions also afflicted the Persians, 
spilling through the Caspian gates into the Mesopotamian heartland of the empire. Further east, 
Eurasian nomads even passed through the mountains of the Hindu Kush and, for a time, 
established a kingdom in northern India.91 What has customarily been considered in 
predominantly western terms emerges instead, from a more global perspective, to be one of a 
number of concurrent (and possibly interconnected) processes affecting a wide sweep of 
territory and a great number of polities. 
By looking across this much broader geographical canvas, we might consider other 
factors that afflicted not only the Roman world, but adjacent territories too. Recent work on the 
palaeoenvironmental history of Eurasia is beginning to suggest that factors completely separate 
from invasion and war were having an impact on the transformation of society.92 It is relatively 
uncontroversial to state that the end of the ancient world witnessed a contraction of economic 
activity. In large measure, the dismemberment of the Roman Empire played a key role in this 
process, since there was simply no longer a need for a sophisticated market economy whose 
chief raison d’être had been the maintenance of Rome’s fiscal and military apparatus. But recent 
research is beginning to suggest some types of economic decline were to be found not only 
within the Empire, but also further afield. For instance, studies of pollen samples from 
archaeological excavations in Poland suggest a contraction of cereal production there in the fifth 
century that is directly comparable to situations in territories that were (or recently had been) in 
the Roman Empire. That strongly suggests that war and upheaval were not the only factors 
underlying change, and new archaeological material is beginning to hint at other possible 
answers. Analysis of alluvial deposits in the Rhône valley suggests a period of considerable 
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climatic upheaval between the fourth century and the seventh: rainfall increased dramatically, and 
it seems likely that agricultural productivity will have declined drastically over an extended 
period. Similar evidence is beginning to be yielded by study of the advances and retreats of 
Alpine glaciers. Between the late-fifth century and until the seventh, a number of these seem to 
have expanded considerably.93 Taken together with the evidence of alluvial deposits in the Rhône 
valley, and numerous references in historical documentation for the period, not least the 
widespread references to the ‘years without summer’ in the mid-sixth century (presumably the 
consequence of some sort of volcanic event),94 the seemingly inescapable conclusion is that the 
end of antiquity and the dawn of the middle ages was accompanied by much colder and wetter 
climatic conditions across much of Eurasia. Given the vulnerability of pre-modern agricultures 
to small shifts in temperature, there is reason to think that these changed climatic conditions 
could have had a devastating impact.95 
To such ecological factors we might also add disease. Just as ancient agriculture was 
fragile, so too was ancient demography, meaning that major epidemics were likely to have 
significant, far-reaching consequences. And the end of the ancient world was accompanied by 
just such an epidemic: the so-called Justinianic plague, first observed at Pelusium in the Nile 
Delta in 541, and which recurred throughout the Mediterranean world, the Near East, and 
northern Europe for some two centuries. The plague had long been known from grim accounts 
in sources ranging from Arabia to Ireland that stressed almost incomprehensible levels of 
suffering and mortality. Historians have justifiably been wary of taking such accounts at face 
value, but recent work on this pandemic is beginning to suggest that its impact was indeed 
profound. Comparison of the late ancient accounts of the disease with modern studies of 
epidemiology would appear to confirm that the epidemic is our first attested incidence of 
bubonic plague. Its impact can be seen across a range of phenomena, including contractions of 
economy and settlement, and demographic decline. Such considerations suggest that plague may 
have been a more decisive factor in the fortunes of the eastern Roman Empire than the Arab 
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invasions of its territory in the seventh century.96 Moreover, plague was not the only disease to 
afflict late ancient populations. Throughout antiquity and the middle ages, malaria was a major 
threat to the health of Mediterranean populations; when it occurred concurrently with plague, 
the impact could be devastating.97 In combination, these ecological and demographic factors 
likely had a profound impact on society, not just in the Roman and post-Roman Mediterranean, 
but also more widely across Eurasia.98 Plainly, the barbarian invasions do not explain everything; 
nor can events in the Roman world be understood in isolation. 
 
Conclusions: risks and prospects 
This paper has argued that any evaluation of the transformations of late antiquity need to resist 
temptations to see the experience of the West in late antiquity as somehow exceptional or 
unique: as I have suggested here, a variety of phenomena traditionally seen as central to the late 
Roman narrative – from barbarian invasion, to religious expansion – and some that are only 
beginning to be explored – such as the history of disease and environmental change – can be 
observed across a wide area of Eurasia between the third century and the eighth. If we simply sit 
tight on a Mediterranean-focussed perspective, we might as well admit that our horizons have 
expanded little since Socrates told his interlocutors in the Phaedo that they sat around their sea 
like frogs or ants around a pond. 
This is not to say that there are not difficulties associated with the sort of global late 
antiquity project outlined here. One obvious problem – and one that I freely admit I am in no 
position to surmount – is that such an undertaking would require a mastery of the histories of a 
wide range of cultures, not to mention their multiplicity of languages;99 as such, a project of the 
sort recommended here might best be undertaken as a collaborative effort.100 Other difficulties in 
adopting a global perspective are that more local histories might get neglected,101 although I hope 
I have made it sufficiently clear that my vision here of world history is made up of myriad local 
narratives, and that we should not lose sight of one in pursuit of the other. Yet, for all these 
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challenges, I still think that the task of seeing late antiquity in world historical perspective is one 
worth pursuing. By considering that wider perspective, we might compensate in two ways for 
what Jack Goody identified as the western theft of history: one that sees the experience of late-
antiquity freed from the shackles of narratives of progress or disruption, and one that sees the 
experience of the Mediterranean and adjacent regions as part of a wider history of humanity, 
sometimes shared, sometimes remarkably distinctive.102 
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